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The Presumption of Advancement: A 
Lingering Shadow in UK Law? 
Abstract: The presumption of advancement is a well-established equitable 
principle in English law, which operates to presume that a purchaser or 
transferor of property intended to transfer the beneficial interest to the 
recipient in certain relationships. However, its future is far from certain. 
While it appeared that the presumption would be abolished by the Equality 
Act 2010 (UK) c 15 s 199, that section has never been brought into force. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the enduring impact of the presumption 
of advancement, and what its future might be. This article considers the 
operation of the presumption of advancement in English law and attempts to 
abolish the presumption via legislative reform. It details a survey of UK case 
law, to ascertain how the presumption is operating in practice, and canvasses 
alternative approaches to dealing with the presumption, drawing on 
comparative perspectives and academic critiques. This article argues that the 
law around the presumption remains unclear and in turmoil. Therefore, while 
it is not necessary to abolish the presumption, reform is necessary.  
I. Introduction 
The presumption of advancement is a well-established equitable principle in English 
law. The presumption has traditionally operated to presume that a purchaser or 
transferor of property intended to transfer the beneficial interest to the recipient of 
property in certain relationships. However, its future is far from certain. The 
presumption has been subjected to significant criticism, including on the grounds that 
it is out-dated and discriminatory, and there are signs that courts are interpreting its 
scope narrowly to limit its impact. While it appeared that the presumption would be 
abolished by the Equality Act 2010 (UK) c 15 s 199, that section has never been 
brought into force. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the enduring impact of the 
presumption of advancement, and what its future might be.  
 
This article commences with a brief discussion of the presumption of advancement in 
English law (Part II) and attempts to abolish the presumption via legislative reform 
(Part III). It then details a survey of UK case law, to ascertain how the presumption is 
operating in practice (Part IV). The article canvasses alternative approaches to dealing 
with the presumption, drawing on comparative perspectives and academic critiques 
(Part V). I argue that the law around the presumption remains unclear and in turmoil. 
Therefore, while it is not necessary to abolish the presumption, reform is necessary.  
II. The presumption of advancement 
The presumption of advancement is a well-known equitable presumption. In equity, if 
a person purchases or transfers property to the name of another, the recipient is 
presumed to hold the property on resulting trust for the purchaser or transferor.
1
 This 
presumption of a resulting trust may be rebutted by the presumption of advancement,
2
 
which traditionally presumes that the purchaser or transferor did intend to transfer the 
beneficial interest to the recipient, so long as the recipient is the male purchaser or 
transferor’s wife,3 fiancée or child; or if the purchaser or transferor stands in loco 
parentis to the recipient. The presumption of advancement (like the presumption of 
resulting trust) can be rebutted by contrary evidence. Thus, it is best regarded as a rule 
of evidence that shifts the burden of proof in certain cases: it is ‘a circumstance of 
evidence which may rebut the presumption of resulting trust’. 4  As noted by 
Brightwell: 
 
the presumption, whether of advancement or of resulting trust, provides a 
fallback position in those cases where, for whatever reason, there is no 
evidence (or no admissible evidence) of the purchaser’s intention. Its purpose, 
accordingly, is to impute an intention.
5
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 This does not appear to apply to transfers of land: Law of Property Act 1925 c 20 s 60(3); Khan v Ali 
(2002) 5 ITELR 232; cf Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited [2013] 2 AC 415, 495 (Lord Sumption). 
See further John Mee, ‘Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances of Land’ [2012] The 
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 For further discussion of this point, see Jamie Glister, ‘Is There a Presumption of Advancement?’ 
(2011) 33 S L R 39. 
3
 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777. 
4
 ibid 814 (Lord Upjohn). 
5
 James Brightwell, ‘Good Riddance to the Presumption of Advancement?’ (2010) 16 Trusts & 
Trustees 627, 629. Though see John Mee, ‘Presumed Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration’ 
(2014) 73 C L J 86. Mee argues that resulting uses, and therefore resulting trusts, only arise if there is 
 The presumption of advancement is said to arise where an individual has a ‘moral 
duty’ to provide for another. For example, in the case of a transfer from husband to 
wife, the husband’s intention is presumed due to his ‘natural obligation to provide’ for 
his wife,
6
 though this obligation is not reciprocated. Glister argues that the 
presumption ‘presumes the fulfillment of a donor obligation to establish the recipient 
in life,’ but that the presumption could equally reflect satisfaction of a ‘maintenance 
obligation, recognition of natural love and affection between the parties, and simple 
likelihood of intention.’7  
 
In this form, the presumption of advancement has been the subject of extensive legal 
and academic criticism. First, the presumption is often described as out-dated or 
antiquated, and is criticised for failing to reflect modern circumstances. In the House 
of Lords case of Pettitt v Pettitt,
8
 Lord Reid doubted the relevance of the presumption 
in modern society, and questioned its logical foundation: 
 
I do not know how this presumption first arose, but it would seem that the 
judges who first gave effect to it must have thought either that husbands so 
commonly intended to make gifts in the circumstances in which the 
presumption arises that it was proper to assume this where there was no 
evidence, or that wives’ economic dependence on their husbands made it 
necessary as a matter of public policy to give them this advantage. I can see no 
other reasonable basis for the presumption. These considerations have largely 
lost their force under present conditions, and, unless the law has lost all 
flexibility so that the courts can no longer adapt it to changing conditions, the 
strength of the presumption must have been much diminished.
9
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
evidence of an intention to establish the resulting use or resulting trust, in accordance with a ‘presumed 
intention to create a trust for the transferor’ model of resulting trusts. 
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7
 Jamie Glister, ‘Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010: How Not to Abolish the Presumption of 
Advancement’ (2010) 73 Mod L Rev 807, 810; see also Jamie Glister, ‘The Presumption of 
Advancement’ in Charles Mitchell (ed), Constructive and resulting trusts (Hart 2010). As noted by 
Lord Upjohn in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 816: ‘these presumptions were invented because that 
represented the common sense  of the matter and what the parties, had they thought about it, would 
have intended.’ 
8
 [1970] AC 777. 
9
 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 793 (Lord Reid). 
Similarly, Lord Diplock saw the presumption as grounded in out-dated assumptions 
derived from the propertied classes in pre-war Britain. According to His Lordship, it 
was inappropriate to apply these presumptions to other classes in post-war society: 
 
It would, in my view, be an abuse of the legal technique for ascertaining or 
imputing intention to apply to transactions between the post-war generation of 
married couples ‘presumptions’ which are based upon inferences of fact which 
an earlier generation of judges drew as to the most likely intentions of earlier 
generations of spouses belonging to the propertied classes of a different social 
era.
10
 
 
Given this scepticism of the presumption, it is unsurprising that courts prefer to hear 
evidence of the parties’ actual intention, rather than applying the presumption: ‘the 
court is increasingly unenthusiastic about the presumption, even in relationships 
where it does apply’.11 Indeed, Lord Diplock in Gissing v Gissing12 interpreted the 
decision in Pettitt v Pettitt to mean that: 
 
even if the ‘presumption of advancement’ as between husband and wife still 
survive[s] today, it could seldom have any decisive part to play in disputes 
between living spouses in which some evidence would be available in addition 
to the mere fact that the husband had provided part of the purchase price of 
property conveyed into the name of the wife.
13
 
 
Thus, the presumption has been described as a ‘judicial instrument of last resort’.14 
The courts have also minimised the impact of the presumption of advancement by 
holding it to be ‘readily rebutted by comparatively slight evidence’.15 As a result, the 
presumption will rarely ‘[prove] to be decisive’.16 Further, as the common intention 
constructive trust comes to ‘play a greater role in determining disputes over equitable 
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interests in the home’, 17  the presumption of advancement will have limited 
application to the family home, reducing the number of cases where it might be 
relevant.
18
  
 
Thus, ‘the presumption of advancement, as between man and wife, which was so 
important in the 18th and 19th centuries, has now become much weakened, although 
not quite to the point of disappearance.’19 As Lord Hodson noted in Pettitt v Pettitt: 
 
In old days when a wife’s right to property was limited, the presumption, no 
doubt, had great importance and to-day, when there are no living witnesses to 
a transaction and inferences have to be drawn, there may be no other guide to 
a decision as to property rights than by resort to the presumption of 
advancement. I do not think it would often happen that when evidence had 
been given, the presumption would today have any decisive effect.
20
 
 
Second, the presumption as it applies in English law has been criticised for arbitrarily 
distinguishing between different types of relationships. For example, the presumption 
does not apply if a marriage is void ab initio,
21
 between de facto couples, between a 
man and his mistress,
22
 or from a wife to her husband.
23
 The presumption does apply, 
however, from a father to a legitimate child,
24
 and from a man to his fiancée.
25
 It is 
still contested whether the presumption applies from mother to child.  
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The Law Commission has described this collection of precedents as ‘archaic and 
discriminatory’,26 particularly given the gendered distinctions between the obligations 
of husbands and wives and, historically, between mothers and fathers.
27
 Richards-
Bray has argued: 
 
The problem with the presumption of advancement, and the reason why we 
will almost certainly bid it farewell in the near future is that it is 
discriminatory in its operation. It operates on the historical, but outdated basis 
that men are in a financial position to care for their spouse and children; 
whereas women are not. This presumption has operated for hundreds of years 
and its underlying premise may have been true at one time, but does not reflect 
the reality of modern life.
28
 
 
Thus, while the presumption may be easily rebutted, ‘the initial position is unequal, 
and … does not reflect the modern legislative approach of treating men and women 
equally.’29  Therefore, the presumption is discriminatory, and is inconsistent with the 
spirit of the Equality Act 2010 (UK) c 15 and Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 3, which seek 
to eliminate all types of unlawful discrimination.
30
 
III. Legislative reform 
While the presumption of advancement has been criticised for decades, it was 
ultimately the European Convention on Human Rights (or the government’s 
interpretation of the Convention) that prompted attempts at legislative reform. In 1998, 
the UK government announced its intention to ratify the Seventh Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. However, there were concerns that the 
presumption of advancement would contravene article 5 of the Protocol,
31
 which 
states:  
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 Andrews (n 30); Richards-Bray (n 28) 29. 
Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private law 
character between them, and in their relations with their children, as to 
marriage, during marriage and in the event of its dissolution. This Article shall 
not prevent States from taking such measures as are necessary in the interests 
of the children. 
 
Glister has argued that the presumption does not breach the protocol, as it is not 
‘properly seen as a right or responsibility of a private law character’,32 instead being a 
rule of evidence. Nevertheless, a number of attempts were made to ensure the 
presumption would not contravene article 5, allowing the government to fulfill its 
commitment to ratify the Protocol. The government explicitly noted its belief that the 
abolition of the presumption of advancement was necessary before ratifying the 
Protocol:  
 
The Government are committed to signing and ratifying protocol 7 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights as soon as the necessary legislative 
changes have been made. In order to fulfil Article 5 of the protocol, which 
demands equality between spouses, it is necessary to … abolish the 
presumption of advancement in respect of gifts between husbands and wives, 
engaged couples and fathers and their children … . We will continue actively 
to seek a suitable legislative vehicle for these changes.
33
  
  
In the first attempt at legislative reform, the Family Law (Property and Maintenance) 
Bill 2005 (a private members’ bill supported by the government) was introduced into 
Parliament, with the intention of abolishing the presumption of advancement between 
husband and wife. As noted in the House of Commons: 
 
The Family Law (Property and Maintenance) Bill is a technical but plucky 
little measure that is intended to abolish or equalise three relatively minor 
rules of law that treat husbands and wives unequally. The changes are needed 
to enable the United Kingdom to ratify article 5 of protocol 7 of the European 
convention on human rights. The UK Government have given a commitment 
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 Glister, ‘Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010’ (n 7) 814. 
33
 Hansard, HL Vol. 716, col. WA26 (January 5, 2010, Lord Bach). 
to ratify that protocol, and they must do so on a United Kingdom-wide basis. 
… Clause 2 would abolish this archaic [presumption of advancement], so that 
there would be no presumption in favour of one spouse on the basis of 
gender.
34
 
 
However, the Bill failed to reach a second reading.  
 
Secondly, in 2010, amendments were made to the Equality Bill (later the Equality Act 
2010) in the House of Lords Committee stage to abolish the presumption. In 
Committee in the House of Lords, Lord Lester of Herne Hill justified the amendments 
on the basis that: 
 
This presumption discriminates against husbands and is outdated. … The 
effect of the presumption of advancement [in applying to men but not women] 
is clearly discriminatory and its abolition will not have any unfair or 
undesirable effects, and therefore this amendment seeks to abolish the 
presumption.
35
  
 
The amendments were subjected to limited discussion in each House.
36
 However, 
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon made it clear that that the amendments were introduced 
to facilitate ascension to the Protocol: 
 
[These amendments] remove existing provisions that are discriminatory and 
out of date. These amendments also address those aspects of UK law that are 
incompatible with Article 5 of the 7th protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
37
  
 
With these amendments, the Equality Act 2010 (UK) s 199 was to abolish the 
presumption of advancement in these terms: 
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 Hansard, HC Vol. 438, col. 830 (November 2, 2005, Rob Marris). 
35
 Hansard, HL Vol.717, col.707 (February 9, 2010). 
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 see further Glister, ‘Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010’ (n 7) 811. 
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(1) The presumption of advancement (by which, for example, a husband is 
presumed to be making a gift to his wife if he transfers property to her, or 
purchases property in her name) is abolished. 
 
(2) The abolition by subsection (1) of the presumption of advancement does 
not have effect in relation to— 
(a) anything done before the commencement of this section, or 
(b) anything done pursuant to any obligation incurred before the 
commencement of this section. 
 
The Explanatory notes to the Act make it clear that s 199 was intended to ‘[abolish] 
the common law presumption of advancement.’  
 
The framing of s 199 has been criticised by Glister, who has argued that: 
 
It is simply impossible to predict what the true effect of the full section 199 
would be, so the best option in terms of legal clarity is not to bring the whole 
section into force at all. … Only subsection 199(1) should ever be brought into 
force: ‘the presumption of advancement . . . is abolished’.38 
 
While it appeared that the government intended to abolish the presumption of 
advancement, as at March 2015, s 199 has not yet been brought into force. Thus, the 
presumption of advancement remains part of English law. Indeed, following a change 
of government, it appears that the Coalition has no intention of bringing s 199 into 
force.
39
 Further, the Coalition government has not signed or ratified the Seventh 
Protocol,
40
 and has no current plans to do so.
41
 The effect has been to reduce any 
                                                 
38
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 Council of Europe, ‘Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms’ (Council of Europe, 23 September 2014) 
incentive to reform the presumption of advancement. This may explain the failure to 
bring s 199 into force.  
 
In sum, then, the law regarding the presumption of advancement remains ‘uncertain 
and complex, and is likely to lead to arbitrary results.’42 The sections that follow 
assess the practical impact of retaining the presumption of advancement as part of UK 
law.  
IV. Enduring impact of the presumption of advancement 
The presumption of advancement currently lies in legal limbo: it is clear that the 
legislative intention was to abolish the presumption, but s 199 has not yet been 
brought into force. Thus, it is necessary to consider what impact (if any) this delay is 
having on individual rights and remedies, and the development of equitable 
jurisprudence. To explore these issues, a survey was conducted of UK cases reported 
between 1 October 2010
43
 and 30 September 2014, to examine the prevalence and 
impact of the presumption of advancement on contemporary case law.
44
 
 
This survey found 21 cases mentioning the presumption of advancement over the time 
period.
45
 Of these cases, eleven only mentioned the presumption in obiter dicta.
46
 The 
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presumption was argued but rebutted by the evidence in two cases,
47
 and could not be 
argued against the Official Receiver in the case of bankruptcy in another.
48
 It was not 
necessary for the court to consider the presumption in three cases,
49
 and the 
presumption did not apply to the relationship under consideration in three cases.
50
 The 
presumption was applied in only one case.
51
 Thus, a preliminary inspection indicates 
that the presumption is having limited impact in decided cases. 
 
The limited impact of the presumption of advancement may be the result of two 
(related) factors. First, advocates may be choosing to not rely on the presumption in 
argument, perhaps recognising the courts’ limited receptiveness to such arguments. 
That said, submissions in Drakeford v Cotton
52
 did raise the presumption, though it 
was not necessary for it to be considered at judgment; and the plaintiff in EG v EG
53
 
also argued that the presumption should apply.
54
 
 
Secondly, the cases indicate that some judges already regard the presumption as a 
‘has-been’ in legal reasoning. In Bhura v Bhura,55 the court held that the presumption 
‘can be regarded as being on its death-bed given that it is abolished by s 199 Equality 
Act 2010, which is awaiting implementation.’ 56  The four-year delay in 
commencement did not alter the Court’s assessment that the presumption was near 
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death.
57
 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott
58
 treated the presumption as 
out-dated and near-dead: 
 
In the context of the acquisition of a family home, the presumption of a 
resulting trust made a great deal more sense when social and economic 
conditions were different and when it was tempered by the presumption of 
advancement. The breadwinner husband who provided the money to buy a 
house in his wife’s name, or in their joint names, was presumed to be making 
her a gift of it, or of a joint interest in it. That simple assumption – which was 
itself an exercise in imputing an intention which the parties may never have 
had - was thought unrealistic in the modern world by three of their Lordships 
in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777. It was also discriminatory as between men 
and women and married and unmarried couples. … The presumption of 
advancement is to receive its quietus when section 199 of the Equality Act 
2010 is brought into force.
59
 
 
Given the government’s unwillingness to bring s 199 into force, this decision may ‘be 
criticised for being too presumptive about the abolition of the presumption of 
advancement.’60 
 
This may also reflect the broader limitations of the presumption: if it may be rebutted 
by ‘comparatively slight evidence’,61 the presumption will only be relevant in a small 
subset of cases, including where there is a lack of evidence of the purchaser or 
transferor’s intention, and the transferor/purchaser and recipient fit the strict classes of 
relationship where the presumption applies.
62
 For example, in Luckwell v Limata
63
 the 
presumption was mentioned but was held to not be relevant on the facts, which 
concerned a transfer from a child to a parent. Similarly, the Court in Chapman v 
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 [2014] 2 FLR 168, [48]. 
Jaume
64
 held that the presumption, while argued in that case, did not apply between 
unmarried cohabitees.
65
  
 
In cases where the presumption did apply to the relationship, it was generally rebutted 
by the intention of the purchaser or transferor. For example, in Chaudhary v 
Chaudhary,
66
 the recipient son argued that the presumption should allow him to keep 
a gift from his father. However, the presumption was rebutted by the father’s 
subjective intention: ‘Mr Chaudhary senior and his wife must have subjectively 
intended that the £5,000 would be for their benefit and so was not intended as a gift 
for Mr Chaudhary.’67 Similarly, in EG v EG68 the presumption (assuming it applied to 
a transfer from mother to daughter) was rebutted by documentary evidence of the 
mother’s intention.69 
 
The presumption was also held not to apply in the case of bankruptcy: in KK v MA
70
 
the Court held that the recipient wife could not argue the presumption against the 
Official Receiver. Thus, the limited practical impact of the presumption between 2010 
and 2014 may reflect the significantly constrained scope of the presumption. The only 
reported case where the presumption was successfully applied was O’Meara v Bank 
of Scotland PLC,
71
 which involved a transfer from a husband to his wife.  
 
However, this does not mean that the presumption of advancement will not have any 
impact in cases in the future. According to the Law Commission, the illegality 
doctrine and reliance principle
72
 have ‘give[n] that presumption an overriding 
importance that it was never intended to have.’73 This may lead to arbitrary results, 
disconnected from the merits of the case: ‘The outcome of the case will turn solely on 
the procedural issue of whether any legal presumption is in play and how closely the 
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illegality is tied up with any evidence that the parties may wish to rely on.’74 Thus, the 
presumption may be determinative of individual rights, at least in cases of illegality. 
Further, the fact that even one case was decided on the basis of the presumption 
means that the presumption of advancement is continuing to have a lingering effect on 
UK law. At the same time, ‘there has no been substantial discussion as to whether [the 
presumption] remains fit for purpose in any circumstances’, including by Parliament 
or the Law Commission.
75
 It is therefore necessary to consider whether this is a 
desirable state of affairs, and whether there is any alternative way for the law to be 
developed.  
V. Options for the future 
From the foregoing analysis, there appear to be four options for the future: to extend 
the presumption to other relationships, in order to remove its discriminatory effect; to 
maintain the status quo; to abolish the presumption prospectively; or to abolish the 
presumption with immediate effect. 
 
A. Extend the presumption 
To address the discriminatory impact of the presumption of advancement, an obvious 
solution would be to extend the presumption to other relationships, to bring mothers 
and wives within its ambit. This extension would make the presumption ostensibly 
gender-neutral in its application. This is consistent with the Law Commission’s 
previous recommendation to extend to presumption to both spouses and the law in 
comparative jurisdictions (discussed further below), and reflects ‘what is believed to 
be the wishes of most married couples’ and parents.76 This change may have limited 
impact in practice, but would help to clarify the law and ‘avoid doubt’.77  
 
This change would not dramatically alter English law: courts have already started to 
apply the presumption to women when they are in similar circumstances to a father or 
husband.
78
 Indeed, in Close Invoice Finance Ltd v Abaowa it was stated: 
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 I would have had no hesitation in deciding that in the modern age the 
presumption of advancement should, indeed, be taken as applying between a 
mother and a daughter in the same way that it does as between a father and his 
child. … the distinction between a father and a mother in relation to the 
presumption of advancement cannot stand today. Our society recognises 
fathers and mothers as having similar obligations in relation to provision for 
their children and recognises that, broadly speaking, fathers and mothers have 
similar degrees of affection for them. Transfers to children by mothers are in 
this day and age as likely to be gifts as are transfers by fathers.
 79
 
 
This approach is also consistent with that adopted in other common law countries, 
like Australia.
80
 In Brown v Brown,
81
 a decision of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal, Gleeson CJ held that: 
 
In the social and economic conditions which apply at the present time the 
drawing of a rigid distinction between male and female parents, for the 
purposes of the application of the presumptions of equity with which we are 
concerned, may be accepted to be inappropriate. I would be prepared, 
although with rather less conviction, to say the same about conditions in 1958. 
I would, therefore, not decide this case upon the basis that, Mrs Brown being a 
mother rather than a father, the presumption of advancement did not apply.
82
 
 
However, the presumption was rebutted by the facts of the case. Kirby P also 
advocated for a ‘gender neutral’ approach to the presumption, expressly ‘terminating 
the gender distinction accepted by earlier judges’.83 This approach was approved by 
the High Court of Australia in Nelson v Nelson: 
 
So long as the presumption of advancement has a part to play, there is no 
compelling reason for making a distinction between mothers and fathers in 
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relation to their children and every reason, in the present social context, for 
treating the situations alike. … In so far as the presumption of advancement 
derives from an obligation of support, its application to mothers who fund the 
purchase of property by their children is logical. In so far as the presumption 
operating in the case of a father and his children derives from their lifetime 
relationship, the same is no less true of a mother and her children. The 
‘egalitarian nature of modern Australian society, including as between the 
sexes’ demands no less.84  
 
The extension of the presumption may also reflect the actual or assumed intentions of 
married couples and parents making transfers. According to Brightwell, parents 
generally intend to make gifts to their children, meaning that the presumption fits with 
the assumed intentions of the parties.
85
 If the extension of the presumption would fit 
with individual intentions, this would obviously be an argument in favour of its 
retention and extension. However, attempting to predict or presume individual 
intentions is a tricky matter, which may be better left to the legislature.
86
 Further, the 
‘presumption of the most likely intention’ may well differ from country to country.87 
 
In sum, then, the extension of the presumption of advancement to women may help to 
remedy its discriminatory impact, and may better reflect the presumed intention of 
parties in modern society. However, while extending the presumption would remedy 
any direct gender discrimination, it may lead to indirect discrimination against 
women. While the economic role and position of women has changed since the 
presumption was first applied, women continue to experience financial inequality and 
disadvantage in England. Writing about the Australian context, Sarmas has criticised 
the extension of the presumption to women. While rejecting an approach that treats 
women differently, the reliance on equality as ‘sameness’ is also harmful given 
women’s on-going economic disadvantage: 
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the presumed egalitarian nature of Australian society is not borne out by 
women’s experience or the available statistics. Feminists and others have 
pointed to the innumerable ways in which women still suffer under conditions 
of inequality. The application of gender ‘neutral’ laws or rules under these 
conditions may not have a ‘neutral’ or ‘equal’ effect on women at all. They 
may in fact further entrench existing systemic inequalities.
88
 
 
This is also the case in the UK, which  
 
retains a male breadwinner/female part-timer gender arrangement within 
which men continue to dominate paid work, and women, although they are in 
employment on the whole, work shorter hours in the labor market than men 
and retain major responsibility for unpaid caring work.
89
  
 
Women generally spend fewer years in the labour market than men and are over-
concentrated in lower-level and lower-waged jobs.
90
 Thus, it is unsurprising that a 
‘gender wealth gap’ persists between women and men in the UK. A 2013 survey of 
2,059 adults in the UK found a ‘gender wealth gap’ of 17% between women and 
men.
91
 As illustrated by Table 1, women are less wealthy than men in nearly every 
age bracket.
92
 
 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
Men £6,060 £21,827 £29,925 £48,895 £82,871 
Women £4,847 £7,648 £18,015 £46,457 £87,091 
Per cent  
difference 
25% 
 
185% 66% 5% 5% 
 
Table 1: Gender Wealth Gap in the UK, 2013 
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The gender wealth gap is even starker in some ethnic groups.
93
 Older women also 
generally have significantly lower pension entitlements than their male counterparts, 
resulting in an additional ‘gender pension gap’ 94  and implying ‘severe gendered 
poverty in old age.’95 Thus, women have less wealth than men, meaning a gratuitous 
transfer to another will affect their overall wealth far more dramatically.  
 
Therefore, extending the presumption may impose a disproportionate burden on 
women in practice. Given the enduring gender inequality in society, ‘any change that 
contributes to [women’s] further dispossession should be viewed with suspicion.’96 
Thus, while it is not desirable to retain the gendered distinctions in the presumption of 
advancement, it is also not desirable to extend the presumption to transfers by wives 
or mothers.
97
 
 
Further, it is unclear whether extending the presumption will actually help it to reflect 
the intentions of married couples or parents. For example, financial contributions by 
parents to their children are strongly influenced by class and ethnicity:  
 
those in working-class occupations amass far fewer resources than their 
middle-class peers and hence face the joint prospect of poverty in old age and 
an inability to financially support their descendants. … Bangladeshi, Pakistani, 
and black respondents emerged as severely wealth-poor ethnic groups, 
building up meager levels of wealth and so accumulating little, if any, 
financial safety nets that could provide financial security either now or in the 
future, for themselves and their dependants.
98
  
 
Thus, the ability to make inter vivos gifts to children is better seen as a white, middle-
class phenomenon, and inter vivos transfers may be more frequent among the 
wealthy:
99
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 Middle-class white families have passed on assets in the form of financial gifts 
to new generations; they have made down payments on first houses, supported 
the college education of the young, and ultimately have left sizeable bequests 
at death. Middle-class black families have not, as yet, been in a position to 
receive substantial assets from older generations.
100
 
 
More particularly, differences in the level of transfers from parents to children may 
arise from cultural factors (such as family norms, and norms of filial and parental 
responsibility), demographic factors (and different family structures) and political and 
institutional factors (such as welfare systems).
101
 Thus, in a country as diverse as the 
UK, where 13% of the normally resident population is born abroad (up from 4.5% in 
1951),
102
 it is likely that there will be significantly different trends in intergenerational 
transfers. Assuming that parents will provide financial gifts to their children 
(including to help with purchasing a house) is grounded in familial norms for white, 
middle class families.   
 
While not all parents or spouses might intend to make a gift, McHugh J in Nelson v 
Nelson
103
 explicitly rejected considering the objective nature of relationships to see if 
the presumption should arise: 
 
[that] would seriously undermine the operation of the presumption of 
advancement. It would allow it to operate only where the surrounding 
circumstances were consistent with the presumption. It would also substitute 
an inquiry into the circumstances of the case for the automatic operation of the 
rule, thus increasing the uncertainty of property titles and promoting litigation. 
As long as the presumption of advancement continues to apply to property 
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dealings, it should apply whenever the parties stand in a relationship that has 
been held to give rise to the presumption. The circumstances surrounding a 
relationship may be used to rebut the presumption, but they cannot be used to 
prevent it from arising.
104
 
 
Applying the presumption uniformly to all relationships may disadvantage certain 
groups and individuals. However, as McHugh J notes, it is not possible to 
differentiate between different relationships based on individual characteristics.
105
 
Therefore, extending the presumption of advancement may inappropriately impose 
white, middle-class norms on a heterogeneous population.  
 
Finally, if the presumption should be extended, we must think carefully about which 
relationships the presumption should be extended to: should the presumption be 
extended only to wives and mothers? Or should it be extended to a broader category 
of relationships, such as de facto spouses? Given same-sex marriage has been 
legalised in the UK by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (UK) c 30, should 
the presumption also be extended to same-sex relationships? Should the presumption 
apply to transfers to adult children, as well as those to younger children?
106
 These 
questions have no easy answers, and raise serious questions about whether the 
presumption is warranted in modern society. Thus, it may be easier (and provide more 
legal clarity) to merely abolish the presumption.  
 
B. Abolish the presumption 
Thus, another alternative would be to abolish the presumption of advancement. This 
has been endorsed by the Law Commission: ‘Our consultation revealed no good 
reason to keep the presumption of advancement. We support its abolition. However, 
we do not think that this alone will cure all the problems [with the illegality 
doctrine].’107  
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If the presumption has limited impact in practice, then its abolition is unlikely to have 
much practical impact, and may help to advance legal certainty and consistency. 
Indeed, the presumption (and, indeed, the presumption of resulting trust) may have 
been replaced by the common intention constructive trust, particularly in the context 
of the family home.
108
 However, a common intention constructive trust will not 
generally cover transfers from parents to children, or transfers relating to property 
other than the family home. Therefore, while the growth of the common intention 
constructive trust may displace the presumption of advancement in many cases, it has 
not excluded it fully. Further, the nature of resulting trusts and constructive trusts 
differ, with the former arising from contributions to the purchase price, and the latter 
derived from the parties’ common intention.109 As a result, the presumption still has a 
role to play in contemporary trusts law. 
 
Abolishing the presumption of advancement may also be consistent with legislative 
trends and developments. For example, the Equality Act 2010 (UK) c 15 s 198 
provides for the abolition of the ‘rule of common law that a husband must maintain 
his wife’. If a husband’s legal obligation to maintain his wife is abolished, this may 
undermine the rationale of the presumption of advancement, as there is no legal 
obligation to provide. However, this would equate the rationale of the presumption of 
advancement with the common law obligation to provide, which is likely 
erroneous.
110
 According to Glister: ‘It is highly doubtful that the common law duties 
to maintain a wife or child were the obligations that equity presumed was [sic] being 
satisfied through the application of a presumption of advancement.’111  Therefore, 
reform to the statutory duties does not necessarily dictate the development of the 
presumption of advancement. Further, like s 199, s 198 has not been brought into 
force, and there is no indication that the government intends to do so in the near 
future.
112
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At a more fundamental level, abolishing the presumption of advancement (and, 
indeed, the presumption of resulting trust) may bring the law into line with 
contemporary needs and expectations: 
 
Transfer of the title of property wholly or partially to another is commonly 
regarded as of great significance, especially by those in de facto relationships. 
The notion that such a deliberate act raised a presumption of a trust in favour of 
the transferor, would astonish an ordinary person.
113
 
 
Individuals realise that the transfer of property is a significant act. By undermining 
individuals’ legal title, the presumptions may go against individual intention in many 
cases. Therefore, the abolition of the presumption may better represent contemporary 
intentions and understandings of property rights: ‘As standards of behaviour alter, so 
should presumptions, otherwise the rationale for presumptions is lost, and instead of 
assisting the evaluation of evidence, they may detract from it.’114 
 
However, if the presumption of advancement was abolished, and the presumption of 
resulting trust retained, this could have significant implications for many families. 
Indeed, it may be more sensible to start with the presumption that familial transfers 
are gifts, until the contrary is proved. Abolishing the presumption may lead to wives 
and children holding property on resulting trust in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary. From a policy perspective, this is not a desirable outcome in many cases. 
Indeed, there may still be a role for legal presumptions relating to gifts between 
family members. While there is limited data available regarding intergenerational 
transfers in the UK,
115
 a survey of EU Member States has found that 
 
Resource transfers from parents to children are much more frequent and 
usually also more intense than those from children to parents. In the ten 
European countries considered here, 21 percent of the respondents have given 
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financial transfers to, and only 3 percent have received financial transfers from, 
their children in the previous 12 months.
116
 
 
Therefore, while transfers are influenced by class and ethnicity, it still appears that 
inter vivos gifts are frequent within the EU, and may account for a significant 
proportion of wealth accumulation in the UK. In studying US data from the 1980s, 
Gale and Scholz found that around one third of wealth transfers occurred inter 
vivos,
117
 with inter vivos transfers estimated to account for at least 20% of US 
household wealth. Thus, abolishing the presumption may have significant 
consequences for many families. 
 
From a practical perspective, abolishing the presumption may also make transactions 
more complicated in family situations: 
 
The effect of abolishing the presumption is that those giving or contributing to 
property will need to make it clear whether they wish to make a gift or retain 
an interest in the property. Where fathers for example, wish to completely 
dispose of their interest in the property given clarity [of intention] will be vital 
… .118 
 
This also raises issues regarding the implementation of the change, should the 
presumption be abolished. Under s 199, the presumption is to be abolished 
prospectively, and the abolition is not to apply to ‘(a) anything done before the 
commencement of this section, or (b) anything done pursuant to any obligation 
incurred before the commencement of this section.’ According to Glister, the effect of 
sub-section (a) is that the presumption will ‘remain relevant for some considerable 
time because it is not unusual for litigation to occur several decades after the relevant 
transfer or purchase.’119 Further, the effect of sub-section (b) is entirely unclear.120 
Thus, abolishing the presumption in these terms may extend the operation of the 
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presumption, and prevent judges from modifying the presumption relationships in the 
transitional period.  
 
Given the difficulties of these transitional provisions, Glister argues that ‘if it is true 
that the presumption is merely a rule of evidence then there is no reason to limit the 
change to cases involving future transfers’. 121  Instead, the section could have 
abolished the presumption with immediate effect to all cases. Recognising concerns 
as to the discriminatory effect of the presumption, it seems inappropriate to retain it 
intact as a feature of English law for the foreseeable future. Therefore, serious 
consideration must be given to the immediate abolition of the presumption, as argued 
by Glister. At the same time, the immediate abolition of the presumption may cause 
significant practical difficulties for some families.  
VI. Conclusion 
The presumption of advancement has a long and fraught history in English law. While 
some have welcomed its demise, this study has demonstrated the enduring impact of 
the presumption. So long as s 199 is not brought into force, the presumption will 
continue to play a role in UK law. This raises serious questions about whether the 
presumption is appropriate in modern society, and the rationale for its on-going 
existence. This article has considered two alternate reforms that may address the 
presumption’s discriminatory impact: extend the presumption; or abolish the 
presumption. Both of these options have serious limitations. While extending the 
presumption to women may be indirectly discriminatory, and further entrench gender 
inequality, abolishing the presumption may cause difficulties in many cases of 
familial transfers.  
 
While the presumption cannot legitimately remain in its current state, it is still entirely 
unclear how we should proceed. In the absence of executive action to secure the 
commencement of s 199, any future development is likely to fall to the courts. At the 
same time, judges may lack the capacity or evidence to determine how presumptions 
should operate in modern society. In an ideal world, this would be a question better 
left to Parliament. In the face of executive inaction, and an unwillingness of 
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government to resolve this issue, judges may have no choice but to reform the law. 
Until this time, the presumption of advancement will continue to cast an unwelcome 
shadow on English law.  
